# Blockchain timestamps in court: a survey of cases, statutes and regulators

*Research for stampthisfile.com. Dated 20 October 2026.*

> **Not legal advice.** This is a research summary, not legal advice. Rules on evidence differ by country, by court and by type of proceeding, and they change. Where it matters, ask a lawyer qualified in the relevant jurisdiction. Items marked **UNVERIFIED** could not be confirmed from a primary source or a reliable secondary source. Do not rely on them without checking.

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## 1. Executive summary

1. **No court decision that names OpenTimestamps (OTS) was found anywhere.** We searched English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Chinese and Korean sources, and ran CourtListener's full-text search of US opinions. The CourtListener search for "OpenTimestamps" returned 0 opinions on 20 Oct 2026. The `OP_RETURN` hits were unrelated uses of the words. Vendor pages that say OTS proofs are "court-admissible" cite no OTS-specific ruling.
2. **Courts have accepted Bitcoin-anchored hashes in general, the same mechanism OTS uses.** Two decisions stand out.
   - **China, Hangzhou Internet Court, *Huatai Yimei v. Daotong*, (2018) Zhe 0192 Min Chu No. 81, 27 June 2018.** A SHA-256 hash of captured web evidence was anchored in Factom and in Bitcoin. The court checked both chains itself, recomputed the hash and admitted the evidence. It also said blockchain evidence should be judged "in an open and neutral manner… case by case", with the standard neither raised nor lowered.
   - **France, Tribunal judiciaire de Marseille, 1st civil chamber, *AZ Factory v. Valeria Moda*, RG 23/00046, 20 March 2025.** In a contested first-instance judgment, the court held copyright ownership of two garment designs "established by the two findings of the Blockchain timestamp dated 5 May 2021 and 15 September 2021". The anchors were on Bitcoin, made through the BlockchainyourIP service, and were recorded by a bailiff. **The judgment contains no technical analysis.** The defendant does not appear to have challenged the blockchain evidence as such. Commentary that reads detailed "conditions" into the ruling goes beyond its text.
3. **China has the most developed binding rules.**
   - SPC Provisions on Internet Courts (2018), Art. 11: internet courts "shall confirm" electronic data whose authenticity is proved by e-signature, trusted timestamp, hash check or blockchain.
   - SPC Online Litigation Rules (2021):
     - Art. 16: data verified on a blockchain is presumed unaltered *after* it was put on-chain.
     - Art. 17: the factors a court reviews when that is challenged.
     - Art. 18: the proponent may have to prove the data was authentic *before* it was put on-chain.
     - Art. 19: expert assistance and court-ordered appraisal.
4. **EU law guarantees admissibility for any electronic timestamp, but no presumption unless it is "qualified".**
   - eIDAS Art. 41(1): an electronic timestamp cannot be refused as evidence just because it is electronic or not qualified.
   - eIDAS Art. 41(2): only a *qualified* timestamp carries a presumption that its date and time are accurate and the data intact.
   - **An OTS proof is a non-qualified electronic timestamp.** Its weight is left to the court.
   - eIDAS 2.0 (Reg. 2024/1183) added electronic ledgers. These are Arts. **45k–45l**, not 45h–45i. Art. 45k(1) is the same non-discrimination rule. Only *qualified* ledgers, run by qualified trust service providers, get presumptions.
   - The implementing act for qualified ledgers is **Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2531** of 16 Dec 2025, in force since 6 Jan 2026.
   - The implementing act for qualified timestamps is **Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1929** of 29 Sept 2025.
   - A public Bitcoin anchor made through OTS is not a qualified service.
5. **Italy is the only EU state with a statute that gives DLT storage timestamp effect.** DL 135/2018 Art. 8-ter(3), converted by L. 12/2019, gives storing a document on DLT the effects of an electronic timestamp under eIDAS Art. 41. That is the *non-qualified* effect, so it adds little to EU law. Art. 8-ter(4) required AgID to set technical standards within 90 days. Sources from 2021 to 2023 say they were never adopted, and we found nothing showing adoption since. We found **no verified Italian judgment**. Rulings cited by vendors (Trib. Roma 20 July 2022; Trib. Brescia 18 Jan 2023) are **UNVERIFIED**.
6. **Spain has a concrete procedural rule worth knowing.**
   - LEC art. 326.3: a non-qualified trust service is assessed through the ordinary contest procedure.
   - LEC art. 326.4: a *qualified* one is presumed correct, and the burden and costs of checking fall on the party who challenges it.
   - We found no Spanish ruling on blockchain timestamps.
7. **US.** Vermont (12 V.S.A. §1913) makes blockchain records self-authenticating with a sworn declaration. It presumes the date and time a record was added, but expressly not the truth of its contents. Arizona (A.R.S. §44-7061), Illinois (205 ILCS 730), Ohio and others treat blockchain records as electronic records and bar exclusion "solely" because a blockchain was used. Federally, FRE 902(13)/(14) let a hash-matched copy self-authenticate on a qualified person's certificate. The rule is for authentication only. We found no US case deciding the weight of a blockchain timestamp. *Hunichen v. Atonomi* (W.D. Wash. 2020) refused to take judicial notice of blockchain transaction records.
8. **Other signals.**
   - India's Supreme Court, *Pune Bar Association v. Union of India*, 22 May 2026: upheld the BSA s.63(4) certificate, which requires hash values for electronic evidence.
   - Brazil's TJSP: has treated blockchain-certified collection as a rebuttable presumption of integrity. Secondary sources only.
   - Korea's Supreme Court: excludes digital copies whose hash differs from the original.
   - Governments use OTS for public records: Guatemala's electoral tribunal in 2023, El Salvador ministries in 2025. These are not court rulings.
9. **What persuades courts.** Courts are persuaded when they can reproduce the check themselves (recompute the hash, find it on chain), when there is a neutral capture process or a bailiff's record, and when other evidence corroborates it. What they doubt is whether the data was authentic *before* it was anchored, who made it, and whether the file shown is the same one. They do not doubt the cryptography.
10. **Bottom line for OTS.** A complete OTS proof is strong evidence that specific bytes existed no later than a Bitcoin block's time, to within a few hours. Courts in China and France have accepted the same mechanism, and EU and many US laws forbid rejecting it merely because it is electronic or on a blockchain. It does not prove authorship, content truth or ownership, and outside China and Vermont it carries no legal presumption. **The evidence base is thin:** two clear first-instance decisions, and no appellate ruling.

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## 2. Jurisdiction table

Strength key:
- **Binding:** a statute or regulation, or a court rule binding in that system.
- **Persuasive:** a court decision, usually first instance and not binding precedent.
- **Commentary:** an agency paper, scholarship, a press report or a vendor claim.

| Jurisdiction | Instrument or case | Date | What it held or said | Strength | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **OTS (global)** | Court decisions citing "OpenTimestamps" | to 20 Oct 2026 | None found. CourtListener full-text search of US opinions found 0 hits. Searches in FR, IT, ES, PT, DE, ZH and KO found only vendor claims. | — | courtlistener.com search API, 2026-10-20 |
| OTS (global) | Peter Todd, *OpenTimestamps announcement* | 15 Sep 2016 | A timestamp proves "*a* message existed, not *the* message". Calendars are not trusted and "at worst… can deny service, not produce false proofs". Bitcoin block times are "very likely" accurate "to within two or three hours", and almost certainly within a day. | Commentary (protocol author) | https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-announcement |
| OTS (Guatemala) | TSE "Immutable Backup" with Simple Proof, using OTS | 2023 | The electoral authority anchored more than 150,000 tally sheets in Bitcoin via OTS. No court use was found. | Commentary (state practice) | https://bitcoinmagazine.com/culture/bitcoin-blockchain-is-fighting-fraud-in-guatemalas-presidential-elections |
| OTS (El Salvador) | Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Environment, with Simple Proof and OTS | 28 Nov 2025 | Official records are hashed and timestamped on Bitcoin, and verification portals are public. | Commentary (state practice) | https://bitcoinmagazine.com/el-salvador-bitcoin-news/el-salvador-partners-with-simple-proof-to-timestamp-government-documents-on-bitcoin-blockchain |
| **China** | Hangzhou Internet Court, *Hangzhou Huatai Yimei Culture Media v. Shenzhen Daotong Technology*, (2018) Zhe 0192 Min Chu No. 81 | 27 Jun 2018 | A third-party platform (Baoquan.com) captured web pages, hashed them with SHA-256 and anchored the hash in Factom and Bitcoin. The court verified the transaction on both chains, recomputed the hash and checked the platform's neutrality and capture method. It admitted the evidence. The court cautioned against "excluding or enhancing the standard since the block chain and other technologies themselves are new", and against "reducing the standard" because the technology is hard to tamper with. | Persuasive (first instance) | Translation in *Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review* 16 (2019) 60: https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/download/5080/4973/8949 ; https://chinajusticeobserver.com/a/how-chinese-courts-review-electronic-evidence-stored-on-blockchain |
| China | SPC Provisions on Several Issues in Trial of Cases by Internet Courts (法释〔2018〕16号), Art. 11 | in force 7 Sep 2018 | Internet courts "shall confirm" electronic data whose authenticity is proved by e-signature, **trusted timestamp, hash verification, blockchain** or a certified e-evidence platform. | Binding (judicial interpretation; internet courts) | https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/116981.html |
| China | SPC Online Litigation Rules (法释〔2021〕12号), Arts. 16–19 | in force 1 Aug 2021 | **Art. 16:** blockchain-stored data that is "consistent after technical verification" may be found unaltered *after* going on-chain, unless enough contrary evidence overturns it. **Art. 17:** if challenged, the court reviews whether the platform complies with national rules, its independence from the parties, its standards, and its technology and process. **Art. 18:** if *pre-chain* authenticity is challenged, the proponent may have to prove the source and generation of the data. If not proved or corroborated, the court "does not confirm its authenticity". **Art. 19:** expert assistants, court-commissioned appraisal and cross-checking. | Binding (judicial interpretation; all courts in online litigation) | https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/309551.html |
| China | SPC Opinions on Strengthening Blockchain Judicial Application (法发〔2022〕16号) | 25 May 2022 | Policy: courts' judicial-blockchain platforms held more than 2.2 billion evidence records, with a goal of a cross-sector judicial blockchain alliance by 2025. | Commentary or policy (judicial document) | https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/360271.html |
| **EU** | eIDAS Reg. 910/2014, Art. 41 | in force 1 Jul 2016 | (1) An electronic timestamp "shall not be denied legal effect and admissibility as evidence… solely on the grounds that it is in an electronic form or that it does not meet the requirements of the qualified electronic time stamp". (2) Qualified: presumption of accuracy of date and time and of data integrity. (3) Recognised across Member States. | Binding | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj ; Italian text reproduced at https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it (GU 12 Feb 2019, notes to Art. 8-ter) |
| EU | Reg. (EU) 2024/1183 (eIDAS 2.0), new Arts. 45k–45l (electronic ledgers) | in force 20 May 2024 | **Art. 45k(1):** an electronic ledger shall not be denied legal effect or admissibility as evidence solely because it is electronic or not qualified. **Art. 45k(2):** records in a *qualified* ledger are presumed to have unique, accurate sequential chronological ordering and integrity. **Art. 45l:** qualified ledgers must be provided by a qualified trust service provider and must ensure ordering and detectability of changes. | Binding | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj/eng ; https://www.european-digital-identity-regulation.com/Article_45_(Regulation_EU_2024_1183).html |
| EU | Implementing Reg. (EU) 2025/2531 (standards for qualified electronic ledgers, under Art. 45l(3)) | adopted 16 Dec 2025; OJ 17 Dec 2025; in force 6 Jan 2026 | Reference standards: ETSI EN 319 401, and ISO 23257 and ISO/TS 23635 for DLT. Requires "unique sequential chronological ordering", "immediate detectability" of changes, and disclosure of "any cautionary time until finality" for consensus ledgers. | Binding | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/2531/oj ; summary https://docs.igrant.io/regulations/implementing-acts-qualified-electronic-ledgers/ |
| EU | Implementing Reg. (EU) 2025/1929 (qualified timestamps, under Art. 42(2)) | 29 Sep 2025 | Adopts ETSI EN 319 421 v1.3.1 and EN 319 422 for qualified timestamps. | Binding | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1929/oj/eng |
| EU | Qualified electronic ledger providers on the EU Trusted List | as of Oct 2026 | We found no source naming any provider granted qualified-ledger status. **UNVERIFIED.** | — | https://eidas.ec.europa.eu/efda/trust-services/browse/eidas/tls |
| **EU, IP** | EUIPO, case-law summary of the Marseille judgment | 2025 | EUIPO's "recent case law" page reports that the Marseille court found Bitcoin-anchored fingerprints to be sufficient proof of rights. | Commentary (EU agency) | https://www.euipo.europa.eu/en/law/recent-case-law/he-court-of-marseille-recognised-blockchain-timestamping-as-legitimate-evidence-of-copyright-ownership (page returned 403 to our fetcher; content seen via search snippet) |
| EU, IP | EUIPN/ICLAD **CP12** Common Practice, *Evidence in trade mark appeal proceedings* (draft v0.7) | 29 May 2020 | Lists "computer-generated timestamps" as a way to date evidence. Notes that "some of the timestamping services are based on blockchain technology". Only qualified timestamps get the eIDAS presumption. Assessment "always remains at the discretion of the appeal bodies". The CP10 practice on internet disclosure of designs is the basis. | Commentary (office practice) | https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/EUIPN/Common_practice/Draft_CP12-Evidence_in_TM_appeal_proceedings.pdf |
| **France** | TJ Marseille, 1st civ. ch., *AZ Factory v. Valeria Moda*, RG 23/00046 | 20 Mar 2025 | Ownership of the economic rights in two designs "is established by the two findings of the Blockchain timestamp dated 05 May 2021 and 15 September 2021". This was combined with public sales under the brand. A separate seizure report was annulled. The judgment was contested ("contradictoire"), at first instance. There is no analysis of hashing, Bitcoin or reliability in the text. Damages of €11,900 plus an injunction. | Persuasive (first instance) | Full text: https://www.legalis.net/jurisprudences/tribunal-judiciaire-de-marseille-1ere-ch-civile-jugement-du-20-mars-2025/ ; notes: https://cyberjustice.blog/2025/08/12/justice-francaise-la-premiere-reconnaissance-de-la-valeur-probatoire-de-la-blockchain/ , https://www.lexing.law/avocats/blockchain-mode-de-preuve-sinvite-dans-la-mode-la-blockchain-mode-de-preuve-et-droits-dauteur/2025/06/26/ |
| France | Commentary reading the Marseille case as setting four conditions (stable hash, public ledger, no change after anchoring, link to an identified person) and as a "commencement de preuve par écrit" (art. 1362 C. civ.) | 19 Feb 2026 | These points **do not appear in the judgment text** we reviewed. Treat them as the author's gloss. | Commentary | https://www.village-justice.com/articles/preuve-numerique-blockchain-que-change-jurisprudence-2025-pour-les,56231.html |
| France | Ordonnance 2016-520 (minibons), Ordonnance 2017-1674 and Décret 2018-1226 ("dispositif d'enregistrement électronique partagé" for unlisted securities) | 2016–2018 | Recording in a shared electronic ledger (DEEP) "tient lieu d'inscription en compte". This concerns securities title, not evidence of existence. | Binding | https://www.afg.asso.fr/app/uploads/2017/12/2017_12_09_Ordonnance_2017-1674-blockchain-1.pdf |
| France | AFNOR NF Z67-147 (internet constats by commissaires de justice) | — | This is a methodology standard for bailiffs' web captures, not a blockchain standard. **No AFNOR blockchain-timestamp standard was found.** Bailiffs do record blockchain anchors in constats, as in the Marseille case. | Commentary (professional standard) | https://www.fidare.fr/articles/specificites-constat-internet |
| **Italy** | DL 135/2018 Art. 8-ter, converted by L. 12/2019 | GU 12 Feb 2019 | (3) Storing an electronic document using DLT "produce gli effetti giuridici della validazione temporale elettronica di cui all'articolo 41" eIDAS. (4) AgID to set technical standards within 90 days. | Binding (but see next row) | https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaArticolo?art.versione=1&art.idGruppo=0&art.flagTipoArticolo=0&art.codiceRedazionale=19A00934&art.idArticolo=8&art.idSottoArticolo=3&art.idSottoArticolo1=10&art.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2019-02-12&art.progressivo=0 |
| Italy | Status of the AgID standards under Art. 8-ter(4) | 2021–2023 sources | "la mancata adozione di standard tecnici e linee guida da parte di AGID rende la disciplina italiana sostanzialmente inapplicata" (Bomprezzi, 9 Sep 2021). Banca d'Italia's draft smart-contract protocol (June 2023) also notes no structured implementation. AgID's 2020 DLT *secure-design* guidelines are a different document. Adoption after 2023 is **UNVERIFIED**; we found none. | Commentary | https://www.agendadigitale.eu/documenti/nuovo-eidas-e-registri-elettronici-le-nuove-regole-e-gli-impatti-per-i-servizi-fiduciari/ ; https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/notizie/2023/Draft_Protocollo_smart_contract.pdf |
| Italy | "Trib. Roma, 20 luglio 2022" and "Trib. Brescia, 18 gennaio 2023" said to recognise blockchain timestamps | — | **UNVERIFIED.** Cited only on a forensic vendor page, with no numbers or parties. Not found in court databases we could reach. No Tribunale di Firenze ruling on blockchain evidence was found. | — | https://www.acquisizioneprovedigitali.it/valore-probatorio-blockchain-timestamp-forense-cripto-indagini/ |
| **Spain** | LEC art. 326.3–326.4, as amended by Ley 6/2020 (DF 2ª) | in force 13 Nov 2020 | 326.3: a challenge to the date and time accuracy or integrity of a document backed by a **non-qualified** trust service follows the ordinary authenticity procedure (expert comparison or other evidence, then "sana crítica"). 326.4: with a **qualified** service on the trusted list, the characteristic is presumed. The challenger bears the burden of checking and pays if wrong, with a fine of €300–1,200 for a reckless challenge. | Binding | https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2000-323 (art. 326) |
| Spain | Case law on blockchain timestamps | to Oct 2026 | None found. A University of Seville article states there is no Spanish case law expressly recognising blockchain content as evidence, although nothing prevents it. A Barcelona commercial judge was reported in 2019 to say blockchain evidence needs expert support (press report; **original not retrieved**). STS 326/2019 (bitcoin is not money) is not about timestamps. | Commentary | https://revistascientificas.us.es/index.php/ies/article/download/24724/22095/115994 ; https://www.eleconomista.es/legislacion/noticias/10120161/10/19/El-blockchain-no-sirve-de-prueba-en-un-juzgado-Mercantil-salvo-que-le-avale-un-peritaje.html |
| Spain | Notaries and blockchain | — | Spanish notaries run their own secure network (ANCERT), which is not a blockchain. Notarial bodies have discussed blockchain but treat it as "mere data recording". No notarial blockchain-timestamping scheme was found. | Commentary | https://elderecho.com/futuro-del-notario-ante-desarrollo-del-blockchain |
| **Portugal** | DL 66/2023 (DLT Pilot Regime, Reg. 2022/858) | Aug 2023 | Market-infrastructure law; not about evidence. | Binding (out of scope) | https://www.garrigues.com/pt/pt-PT/news/regulamento-dlt-o-regime-piloto-infraestruturas-mercado-baseadas-na-tecnologia-registo |
| Portugal | TRE (Évora), proc. 351/23.6JAFAR.E1 | 2023–24 | Digital evidence and chain of custody: the hash is used to show a copy is identical to the original. Notes Portugal has no specific regulation of digital-evidence preservation. Blockchain is not mentioned. **No Portuguese blockchain-evidence ruling was found.** | Persuasive (indirect) | https://www.dgsi.pt/jtre.nsf/134973db04f39bf2802579bf005f080b/860d36d059c0111680258be20035bfb8 |
| **Germany** | ZPO §371a | current | Gives private electronic documents the probative force of private deeds **only** with a qualified electronic signature (or notarially certified electronic signature), and public electronic documents that of public deeds. Timestamps and blockchain proofs are not covered. They are objects of visual inspection (§371) under free evaluation (§286). | Binding | https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/__371a.html |
| Germany | Case law on blockchain timestamps | to Oct 2026 | None found. An OLG Jena ruling treating screenshots as weak visual-inspection evidence is cited by vendors (one gives "2 U 524/17"): **UNVERIFIED.** | — | https://www.bernstein.io/blockchain-evidence-in-court |
| **Switzerland** | DLT Act (amendments to 10 statutes, incl. CO Arts. 973d–973i, "Registerwertrechte") | in force 1 Feb and 1 Aug 2021 | Ledger-based securities. Not an evidence rule for timestamps. Evidence is under the Civil Procedure Code (electronic files are "Urkunden", free assessment). Qualified timestamps are under ZertES. *Swiss procedure and ZertES texts were not fetched for this report.* | Binding (out of scope for timestamps) | https://cms.law/en/che/legal-updates/the-new-swiss-blockchain-dlt-laws-have-been-finalised-and-presumably-enter-into-force-early-2021 |
| **UK** | Assimilated eIDAS Art. 41 (UK) | in force; para. 3 omitted from 31 Dec 2020 | Same non-discrimination rule and qualified-timestamp presumption as in the EU. | Binding | https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2014/910/article/41 |
| UK | Law Commission, *Smart legal contracts: Advice to Government* | Nov 2021 | The existing law of England and Wales "is clearly able to facilitate and support" smart legal contracts. No statutory reform is needed, except for deeds and private international law. | Commentary (law reform body) | https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/smart-contracts/ |
| UK | Electronic Trade Documents Act 2023 | RA 20 Jul 2023; in force 20 Sep 2023 | Electronic trade documents need a technology-neutral "reliable system". Blockchain is neither required nor named. | Binding (out of scope for timestamps) | https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2023/08/uk-electronic-trade-documents-act-2023-a-further-step-towards-paperless-trade.pdf |
| UK | Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025 | RA 2 Dec 2025 | Third category of personal property. Not evidence. | Binding (out of scope) | https://lawcom.gov.uk/news/the-property-digital-assets-etc-act-2025-has-received-royal-assent/ |
| UK | MoJ call for evidence on the presumption that computers operate correctly | 21 Jan – 15 Apr 2025 | Reconsidering the common-law presumption after Horizon. No published outcome was found. | Commentary (policy) | https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/use-of-evidence-generated-by-software-in-criminal-proceedings/use-of-evidence-generated-by-software-in-criminal-proceedings-call-for-evidence |
| **US (Vermont)** | 12 V.S.A. §1913 | 2016; amended 2018 and 2024 | A blockchain record is self-authenticating under V.R.E. 902 with a sworn declaration by a qualified person. It is a business record under 803(6) unless untrustworthy. Presumed: authenticity, the **date and time it was added**, and the identity of the recorder. "A presumption does not extend to the truthfulness, validity, or legal status of the contents." | Binding (Vermont courts) | https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/12/081/01913 |
| US (Arizona) | A.R.S. §44-7061 (HB 2417) | 2017 | A record or signature "secured through blockchain technology" is an electronic record or signature. Smart-contract terms are valid. Ownership of information is unchanged by securing it on a blockchain. | Binding (Arizona) | https://www.azleg.gov/ars/44/07061.htm |
| US (Illinois) | Blockchain Technology Act, 205 ILCS 730/10 (P.A. 101-0514) | eff. 1 Jan 2020 | (a) A record, signature or smart contract may not be denied legal effect "solely because a blockchain was used". (b) In a proceeding, evidence "must not be excluded solely" on that ground. | Binding (Illinois) | https://ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/020507300K10.htm |
| US (others) | Ohio (UETA amendment, 2018); Tennessee (Tenn. Code §47-10-201, 2018); Nevada (NRS ch. 719 and SB 163 of 2019 on blockchain corporate records); Delaware (DGCL amendments of 2017 allowing distributed-ledger stock ledgers) | 2017–2019 | Treat blockchain records as electronic records, or allow corporate records on DLT. Tennessee's and Delaware's texts were **not fetched** here. | Binding (each state) | https://webiis06.mondaq.com/unitedstates/fin-tech/728426/ohio-enacts-blockchain-legislation ; https://archive.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Bills/SB/SB163_EN.pdf |
| US (federal) | FRE 902(13), 902(14) | eff. 1 Dec 2017 | A record from a process "that produces an accurate result", and data copied and "authenticated by a process of digital identification" (in practice, a hash), self-authenticate on a qualified person's certificate. Committee note: "solely limited to authentication". The opponent may still object on hearsay, relevance or other grounds. | Binding (federal courts) | https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_902 |
| US | *Hunichen v. Atonomi LLC*, 2020 WL 6875558 (W.D. Wash. 2020) | 2020 | The court refused to take judicial notice of blockchain transaction records on a 12(b)(6) motion because their content and completeness were disputed. | Persuasive | As discussed in Sahara, *Blockchain Evidence: How Smart Litigators Can Keep It Out at Trial*, 92 Fordham L. Rev. Online 42 (2024): https://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Sahara-042-059.pdf |
| US | *United States v. Sterlingov*, No. 24-3161 (D.C. Cir.) | 25 Sep 2026 | Affirmed the admission of blockchain-*tracing* expert evidence (Chainalysis Reactor) under Rule 702/Daubert, even though there was no peer review or known error rate. Not about timestamps, but shows how courts treat blockchain experts. | Persuasive (federal appellate) | https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3161/24-3161-2026-09-25.html |
| US | US cases ruling on the weight of a blockchain *timestamp* | to Oct 2026 | None found. | — | CourtListener search, 2026-10-20 |
| **India** | *Pune Bar Association v. Union of India*, W.P.(C) 599/2026, Supreme Court | 22 May 2026 | Upheld BSA 2023 s.63(4) and its Schedule, which require a certificate with the **hash value** for electronic evidence. The court called a hash an "electronic fingerprint" that provides a sure way to verify data. | Binding (Supreme Court; on the certificate rule, not on blockchain) | https://indiankanoon.org/doc/5836207/ ; https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-s634-bsa-mandating-hash-value-disclosure-for-electronic-evidence-535950 |
| **Brazil** | TJSP, AI 2237253-77.2018.8.26.0000, 5th Private Law Chamber (rapporteur Fernanda Gomes Camacho) | 2019 | Interlocutory. The court noted the plaintiff's OriginalMy blockchain preservation of offensive posts as "hábil a comprovar a veracidade e existência dos conteúdos", but did not rule on its validity. | Persuasive (weak, interlocutory) | https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/298803/magistrada-considera-valido-registro-de-prova-em-blockchain-em-acao-sobre-conteudo-ofensivo |
| Brazil | TJSP, case 1104931-57.2025.8.26.0100 (industrial property) | 2025–26 | Reported to hold that blockchain-certified collection of digital evidence gives a **rebuttable presumption** of authenticity and integrity, and that a generic claim that "digital evidence can be manipulated" is not enough to rebut it. Reported only by a secondary source; the judgment text was not seen. **Partly UNVERIFIED.** | Persuasive | https://justarbitration.com.br/2026/02/04/blockchain-e-prova-digital-a-posicao-do-tjsp-sobre-a-integridade-da-evidencia-em-casos-de-violacao-da-propriedade-industrial/ |
| **South Korea** | Supreme Court 2017도13263 | 8 Feb 2018 | A digital copy whose hash differs from the original's cannot be admitted without explaining the difference. Identity and integrity must be proved by the prosecution. Blockchain is not mentioned. **No Korean blockchain-timestamp ruling was found.** | Binding (precedent on hashes) | https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/article.kci?arti_id=ART002343517 |
| **UAE** | DIFC Courts, blockchain credentials (Avalanche) for court documents | reported Oct 2026 | The court anchors fingerprints of its own orders so recipients can verify them. This is not an evidence ruling. | Commentary (court practice) | https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/difc-courts-introduce-blockchain-verification-for-court-documents-1.500710179 |
| **WIPO** | *Blockchain technologies and IP ecosystems* (white paper, CWS Blockchain Task Force) | Feb 2022 | "A time-stamp proves the existence of a document, but there is no need to reveal this information unless required in a legal dispute". It is useful for proof of use, trade secrets and pre-filing records, but "uncertainty prevails" because admissibility and weight "may differ in each jurisdiction". Evidence must be generated *periodically, in advance*. | Commentary (IGO) | https://www.wipo.int/cws/en/pdf/blockchain-for-ip-ecosystem-whitepaper.pdf |
| WIPO | WIPO PROOF (PKI timestamp service, not blockchain) | launched 2020; reported discontinued 2022 | Discontinuation is **UNVERIFIED** from a WIPO source. | Commentary | https://cms.law/en/are/legal-updates/wipo-proof-wipo-s-new-online-service-which-helps-innovators-and-creators-better-protect-their-intellectual-assets |

---

## 3. Themes

### 3.1 What courts accepted

- **Hash plus anchor, checked by the court.** In Hangzhou the judges looked up the transaction on Factom and Bitcoin, compared heights and times with the capture log, recomputed SHA-256 over the submitted package, and found a match. That is the whole OTS verification flow, done by hand.
- **Timestamp as one piece of a pattern.** Marseille relied on the blockchain findings *together with* commercial exploitation under the brand, after annulling a defective seizure report. In Hangzhou the court weighed the platform's independence and capture tooling together with the chain anchor.
- **Statutory non-discrimination.** eIDAS Art. 41(1) and 45k(1), Italy Art. 8-ter(3), Illinois 205 ILCS 730/10(b) and Arizona §44-7061 all stop a court from rejecting evidence *only* because it is electronic or on a blockchain. None of them makes it conclusive.
- **Presumptions where they exist.**
  - China, Art. 16: the data is unaltered after it was put on-chain.
  - Vermont: the record is authentic, along with the date and time it was added and the identity of the recorder.
  - EU: only for *qualified* timestamps and ledgers.
  - Spain, art. 326.4: only for *qualified* services.

### 3.2 What courts and lawmakers doubted

- **Authenticity before anchoring.** China's Art. 18 is the clearest rule. A timestamp proves the bytes did not change after anchoring, not that they were genuine when anchored. Vermont's presumption likewise "does not extend to the truthfulness… of the contents".
- **Neutrality of whoever captured or anchored the data.** Hangzhou examined the shareholders of the platform, and China's Art. 17 lists the platform's interest in the outcome as a factor. OTS reduces this risk, because the calendars cannot forge proofs and anyone can verify against Bitcoin. Capture tooling, though, is still a question.
- **Identity and authorship.** Every source agrees that a hash on a chain says nothing about who made the file. Commentators on Marseille stress that ownership was shown with other evidence.
- **Reliability of the system as a whole.**
  - The US Fordham piece argues that forks and immutability can be attacked, especially on smaller chains.
  - The UK is reconsidering the presumption that computers work properly.
  - China's Art. 17 asks about standards compliance.
  - For Bitcoin, which is deep and widely replicated, this is a weak attack. For minor chains it is stronger.
- **Judicial notice is not automatic.** *Hunichen v. Atonomi* refused to treat blockchain records as indisputable public records at the pleading stage.

### 3.3 What made evidence persuasive

1. **Reproducibility.** The court or an expert could rerun the hash and look up the anchor independently.
2. **A neutral, documented capture,** such as a third-party platform with logs, or a bailiff's constat recording the anchors (Marseille, constat of 19 Oct 2022 per the parties' submissions).
3. **Corroboration:** sales, publications, trademark filings, logs.
4. **Timing.** The anchor predates the dispute by a long way (Marseille: 2021 anchors, 2022 suit). WIPO stresses that such evidence "cannot be created after" the need arises.
5. **A mainstream public chain.** Bitcoin was used in both key decisions.

### 3.4 Expert evidence: how OTS and Bitcoin proofs are explained, and the usual challenges

No reported decision describes an expert presenting an **OTS** proof. The table below is built from the Chinese rules and judgment, the US authentication framework, the protocol documentation and bitcoin-dev analysis. Use it as a checklist for an expert report.

| Challenge | Answer that has worked or is technically sound | Source |
|---|---|---|
| **Is the timestamp accurate?** | The proof shows existence no later than the block. Bitcoin consensus requires a block's time to be greater than the median of the previous 11 blocks and less than network-adjusted time plus 2 hours, so block times are "accurate only to within an hour or two". OTS's author says "within two or three hours", "almost certainly within a day". Peter Todd (2016) proposed a conservative bound: take the maximum nTime over N later blocks plus an offset. For disputes measured in days or more, this is immaterial. For disputes measured in minutes or hours, it is not, so use a qualified RFC 3161 timestamp as well. | https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_timestamp ; https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-announcement ; https://mirror.b10c.me/lists/bitcoindev/20160918042001.GA9076@fedora-21-dvm/t/ |
| **Lower bound / backdating.** | A timestamp gives only an upper bound ("existed no later than"). It cannot show when a file was *created*. Earliest creation must come from other evidence, such as drafts, logs or emails. | Todd 2016 (timestamps prove existence before a time, not ordering) |
| **Is this the same file?** | Recompute SHA-256 on the original bytes and show it matches the digest committed in the `.ots`. Then follow the commitment path to the Merkle root in the block's transaction. This is the same reasoning as FRE 902(14) (hash-matched copy) and the Korean Supreme Court's hash-identity test. If even one byte changes (a re-save, metadata stripping, re-encoding), the match fails. | FRE 902 committee note; Korea 2017도13263; Hangzhou judgment |
| **Was it really anchored? Who says so?** | Verify against a Bitcoin node or several block explorers. OTS calendars are not trusted: they "can deny service, not produce false proofs". A *pending* proof (calendar promise only) is weaker and should be upgraded to a complete Bitcoin attestation. | Todd 2016 |
| **Chain of custody of the original.** | Document where the original file was stored, who had access, and how it was copied (hash at each step). China's Art. 18 and the Évora chain-of-custody ruling show the focus on the original's source and handling. | SPC 2021 Art. 18; TRE proc. 351/23.6JAFAR.E1 |
| **Link to identity and authorship.** | A timestamp does not do this. Add a qualified electronic signature or seal (eIDAS; ZPO §371a), a notarial or bailiff act, account-linked records, or witnesses. Vermont presumes the identity of the recorder only "through the blockchain", which a bare OTS proof does not establish. | 12 V.S.A. §1913; ZPO §371a |
| **Expert qualification and method reliability.** | Rule 702/Daubert-style scrutiny applies. *Sterlingov* shows courts accept blockchain experts who explain their methods, show corroboration and point to industry acceptance. OTS has an open spec and independent implementations, which helps. | *US v. Sterlingov* (D.C. Cir. 2026) |
| **Hearsay or business record (US).** | 902(13)/(14) settle authentication only. A hash-and-block-time proof is arguably machine output rather than a human assertion, but this has not been tested for OTS. Vermont's statute routes blockchain records through 803(6). | FRE 902 notes; 12 V.S.A. §1913 |
| **Cryptographic obsolescence.** | SHA-256 and Bitcoin's PoW remain current, and the ENISA mechanisms cited in Reg. 2025/2531 include SHA-256. For decades-long retention, re-timestamp the original and old proof with newer algorithms. | Implementing Reg. 2025/2531 annex (via igrant summary) |

### 3.5 IP practice

- **Copyright and designs (creation and ownership):** the strongest use, because Marseille is directly on point. The EUIPO publicised the Marseille case, and CP12 recognises computer-generated timestamps, blockchain-based ones included, as a way to date evidence. The weight is discretionary.
- **Prior art and novelty:** a hash on a chain discloses nothing, so it is **not** a publication and does not create prior art. It can support *prior possession or use*. For example, it can support prior-user rights or trade-secret existence, but these turn on national law and other evidence. WIPO's white paper points to trade secrets and pre-filing records.
- **Trademarks:** WIPO suggests periodic timestamping of proof-of-use material, so dated evidence exists before any non-use challenge.

---

## 4. Open questions

1. **Will any appellate court rule on a Bitcoin-anchored timestamp?** Both key decisions are first instance. Marseille's reasoning is one sentence.
2. **Has any court named OpenTimestamps?** None found. A dispute over the semantics of a *pending* versus *complete* `.ots` has never been litigated.
3. **Italy:** has AgID ever adopted the 8-ter(4) standards? If not, does 8-ter(3) still operate, given that eIDAS Art. 41(1) gives the same non-qualified effect anyway?
4. **EU qualified ledgers:** will any QTSP offer a qualified ledger service that anchors to a public chain such as Bitcoin, and would that carry the Art. 45k(2) presumption to OTS-style proofs? Reg. 2025/2531's wording on "cautionary time until finality" suggests consensus ledgers are contemplated. No qualified ledger provider was confirmed as of Oct 2026.
5. **US hearsay:** is a block time a "statement"? How do courts outside Vermont treat a sworn declaration about a public-chain anchor?
6. **Pre-anchoring authenticity:** how much will courts outside China demand under rules like Art. 18? Will "stamp early and often" be enough?
7. **Unverified Italian (Rome, Brescia), German (OLG Jena) and Brazilian (TJSP 2025) items** need primary-source confirmation.
8. **UK computer-evidence presumption:** the outcome of the 2025 MoJ review could change how any software-generated evidence, timestamps included, is admitted.

---

## 5. Sources

Primary sources (statutes, regulations, judgments, official texts):
- Hangzhou Internet Court, (2018) Zhe 0192 Min Chu No. 81, English translation: *Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review* 16 (2019): https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/download/5080/4973/8949
- SPC, 人民法院在线诉讼规则 (法释〔2021〕12号): https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/309551.html
- SPC, 关于互联网法院审理案件若干问题的规定 (法释〔2018〕16号): https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/116981.html
- SPC, 关于加强区块链司法应用的意见 (法发〔2022〕16号): https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun/xiangqing/360271.html
- TJ Marseille, 20 Mar 2025, AZ Factory v. Valeria Moda: https://www.legalis.net/jurisprudences/tribunal-judiciaire-de-marseille-1ere-ch-civile-jugement-du-20-mars-2025/
- Regulation (EU) 910/2014: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1183: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj/eng
- Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2531: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/2531/oj
- Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1929: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1929/oj/eng
- Italy, DL 135/2018 Art. 8-ter (GU 12 Feb 2019): https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaArticolo?art.versione=1&art.idGruppo=0&art.flagTipoArticolo=0&art.codiceRedazionale=19A00934&art.idArticolo=8&art.idSottoArticolo=3&art.idSottoArticolo1=10&art.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2019-02-12&art.progressivo=0
- Spain, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil art. 326: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2000-323
- Germany, ZPO §371a: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/__371a.html
- UK, assimilated eIDAS Art. 41: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2014/910/article/41
- Vermont, 12 V.S.A. §1913: https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/12/081/01913
- Arizona, A.R.S. §44-7061: https://www.azleg.gov/ars/44/07061.htm
- Illinois, 205 ILCS 730/10: https://ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/020507300K10.htm
- Nevada SB 163 (2019): https://archive.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Bills/SB/SB163_EN.pdf
- Federal Rules of Evidence 902: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_902
- *United States v. Sterlingov*, No. 24-3161 (D.C. Cir. 25 Sep 2026): https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3161/24-3161-2026-09-25.html
- *Pune Bar Association v. Union of India* (SC India, 22 May 2026): https://indiankanoon.org/doc/5836207/
- TRE Évora, proc. 351/23.6JAFAR.E1: https://www.dgsi.pt/jtre.nsf/134973db04f39bf2802579bf005f080b/860d36d059c0111680258be20035bfb8
- Korea Supreme Court 2017도13263 (commentary page): https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/article.kci?arti_id=ART002343517
- EUIPN CP12 draft v0.7 (29 May 2020): https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/EUIPN/Common_practice/Draft_CP12-Evidence_in_TM_appeal_proceedings.pdf
- WIPO, *Blockchain technologies and IP ecosystems* (2022): https://www.wipo.int/cws/en/pdf/blockchain-for-ip-ecosystem-whitepaper.pdf
- UK MoJ call for evidence (2025): https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/use-of-evidence-generated-by-software-in-criminal-proceedings/use-of-evidence-generated-by-software-in-criminal-proceedings-call-for-evidence
- UK Law Commission, Smart contracts project: https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/smart-contracts/
- UK Law Commission, Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025: https://lawcom.gov.uk/news/the-property-digital-assets-etc-act-2025-has-received-royal-assent/

Technical sources:
- Peter Todd, OpenTimestamps announcement (2016): https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-announcement
- Peter Todd, "Interpreting nTime for the purpose of Bitcoin-attested timestamps", bitcoin-dev (18 Sep 2016): https://mirror.b10c.me/lists/bitcoindev/20160918042001.GA9076@fedora-21-dvm/t/
- Bitcoin Wiki, Block timestamp: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_timestamp
- OpenTimestamps: https://opentimestamps.org

Secondary sources (case notes, scholarship, press):
- China Justice Observer, How Chinese courts review electronic evidence stored on blockchain: https://chinajusticeobserver.com/a/how-chinese-courts-review-electronic-evidence-stored-on-blockchain
- Cyberjustice blog on Marseille (12 Aug 2025): https://cyberjustice.blog/2025/08/12/justice-francaise-la-premiere-reconnaissance-de-la-valeur-probatoire-de-la-blockchain/
- Legalis news note: https://www.legalis.net/actualite/droit-dauteur-preuve-de-la-titularite-par-la-blockchain/
- Lexing (Alain Bensoussan Avocats): https://www.lexing.law/avocats/blockchain-mode-de-preuve-sinvite-dans-la-mode-la-blockchain-mode-de-preuve-et-droits-dauteur/2025/06/26/
- Village de la Justice (C. Barbe, 19 Feb 2026): https://www.village-justice.com/articles/preuve-numerique-blockchain-que-change-jurisprudence-2025-pour-les,56231.html
- EUIPO recent case law (Marseille): https://www.euipo.europa.eu/en/law/recent-case-law/he-court-of-marseille-recognised-blockchain-timestamping-as-legitimate-evidence-of-copyright-ownership
- Agenda Digitale (C. Bomprezzi, 9 Sep 2021): https://www.agendadigitale.eu/documenti/nuovo-eidas-e-registri-elettronici-le-nuove-regole-e-gli-impatti-per-i-servizi-fiduciari/
- Banca d'Italia draft smart-contract protocol (June 2023): https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/notizie/2023/Draft_Protocollo_smart_contract.pdf
- Univ. Sevilla, *Blockchain e implicaciones procesales en materia probatoria*: https://revistascientificas.us.es/index.php/ies/article/download/24724/22095/115994
- A. Sahara, 92 Fordham L. Rev. Online 42 (2024): https://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Sahara-042-059.pdf
- Migalhas on TJSP AI 2237253-77.2018.8.26.0000 (25 Mar 2019): https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/298803/magistrada-considera-valido-registro-de-prova-em-blockchain-em-acao-sobre-conteudo-ofensivo
- Just Arbitration on TJSP 1104931-57.2025.8.26.0100 (4 Feb 2026): https://justarbitration.com.br/2026/02/04/blockchain-e-prova-digital-a-posicao-do-tjsp-sobre-a-integridade-da-evidencia-em-casos-de-violacao-da-propriedade-industrial/
- LiveLaw on Pune Bar Association: https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-s634-bsa-mandating-hash-value-disclosure-for-electronic-evidence-535950
- CMS on the Swiss DLT laws: https://cms.law/en/che/legal-updates/the-new-swiss-blockchain-dlt-laws-have-been-finalised-and-presumably-enter-into-force-early-2021
- Clifford Chance on the ETDA 2023: https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2023/08/uk-electronic-trade-documents-act-2023-a-further-step-towards-paperless-trade.pdf
- Bitcoin Magazine, Guatemala 2023: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/culture/bitcoin-blockchain-is-fighting-fraud-in-guatemalas-presidential-elections
- Bitcoin Magazine, El Salvador (28 Nov 2025): https://bitcoinmagazine.com/el-salvador-bitcoin-news/el-salvador-partners-with-simple-proof-to-timestamp-government-documents-on-bitcoin-blockchain
- Gulf News, DIFC Courts blockchain verification: https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/difc-courts-introduce-blockchain-verification-for-court-documents-1.500710179
- igrant.io summary of Reg. 2025/2531: https://docs.igrant.io/regulations/implementing-acts-qualified-electronic-ledgers/

Vendor sources (used only to identify claims to check; never relied on for holdings):
- https://www.bernstein.io/blockchain-evidence-in-court
- https://www.acquisizioneprovedigitali.it/valore-probatorio-blockchain-timestamp-forense-cripto-indagini/
- https://getproofsnap.com/ (various pages)
- https://blockchainyourip.com/communique-de-presse-la-france-reconnait-officiellement-la-preuve-blockchain-dans-une-affaire-de-contrefacon

Method note: searches were run on 20 Oct 2026 using web search (standard and extended modes), direct fetches of official texts (BOE, Gazzetta Ufficiale, gesetze-im-internet, legislation.gov.uk, Vermont and Arizona legislatures, court.gov.cn, Cornell LII) and the CourtListener v4 search API. EUR-Lex blocked automated fetches, so the eIDAS article texts were taken from the Italian Gazzetta reproduction, from legislation.gov.uk (UK version) and from secondary mirrors.